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A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency 
from the Civil War to Iraq
by Mark Moyar
Reviewed by Gregory A. Daddis, Academy Professor, 
Department of History, US Military Academy
As the American commitment to South Vietnam grew  in the early 1960s, so too did the literature on 
counterinsurgency. In fact, so fashionable had the topic 
become that military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin decried 
“the muddy verbosity and the pompous profundity that 
are beginning to mask the whole subject of counterinsur-
gency and guerrilla war.” Baldwin likely would not be 
surprised by the similarly abundant musings on counterinsurgency in the last 
five years. He might, however, have had his interest piqued by Mark Moyar’s 
latest contribution, which maintains that leadership is at the heart of successful 
counterinsurgencies. In fact, A Question of Command requires careful reading.
Moyar, the Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the US 
Marine Corps University, argues that the “leader-centric nature of counterin-
surgency” demands identifying and developing commanders who are more 
flexible, creative, and intellectually agile than their conventional counterparts. 
Through nine historical case studies ranging from the American Civil War to 
the present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Moyar’s aim is to isolate the lead-
ership attributes of successful counterinsurgents. Indeed, he has ascertained ten 
such attributes. Effective counterinsurgency leaders share the qualities of initia-
tive (a major theme in this work), flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, 
charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization. Unfortunately, 
Moyar offers little insight into how he identified these attributes, leaving the 
reader to question his methodology for historical analysis.
The historical case studies form the bulk of A Question of Command, 
and Moyar uses them not only to display the significance of leadership in uncon-
ventional warfare but also to critique “population-centric” and “enemy-centric” 
theories of counterinsurgency. In the process, he attacks “doctrine or strategy 
that dictates in detail how to defeat the insurgents.” Neither social, political, 
and economic reforms nor using armed force to defeat insurgencies guarantee 
success. Rather, Moyar argues, the leader who is able to adjust his methods to 
local conditions is the most important factor. In the Civil War, as an example, 
effective Union commanders labored to separate hostile civilians from friendly 
and weighed the consequences before using armed force. (According to Moyar, 
depopulation and forced resettlement, if done correctly, have benefits.) Poor 
leaders allowed corruption to flourish in their commands while more capable 
officers fixed bureaucratic weaknesses and replaced unprincipled commanders 
who abused the local populace.
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In a refreshing addition to counterinsurgency literature, Moyar also 
considers the Reconstruction era. As in the Civil War, Federal troops contended 
with political ambiguities of an occupation mission and local elites who still 
enjoyed the loyalty of Southern whites. Likewise, the Philippine Insurrection 
demanded that US officers combat insurgent leaders from the Filipino upper 
class (principalia), bolstering Moyar’s contention that counterinsurgencies 
require subduing or destroying the enemy elite. The Philippines also reinforce a 
major theme: destructive force selectively applied by good commanders is often 
a necessary component of counterinsurgency warfare. As Moyar notes, the “US 
response to the Philippine Insurrection contradicts the view . . . that civic action 
is invariably more effective than military action in defeating insurgents.”
Ensuing case studies further Moyar’s defense of leadership as key 
to counterinsurgency success. The Huk Rebellion in the post-World War II 
Philippines illustrates the importance of host-nation leaders, in this instance, 
Filipino Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay, stimulating effective 
local resistance against insurgents. Moyar employs the Malayan Emergency to 
show how civilian-military interagency committees could direct a war without 
depriving local commanders of their freedom of action. Moyar’s balanced 
chapter on the Vietnam War reveals the trials of counterinsurgency leaders 
attempting to train local forces against an enemy able “to switch back and 
forth between regular and irregular warfare.” Though claims of the “remark-
able transformation of South Vietnamese leadership in the late 1960s and early 
1970s” are unpersuasive, the Vietnam chapter demonstrates that leader devel-
opment in host-nation forces is just as crucial as leader development within the 
US armed forces.
Moyar reserves his final two studies for Afghanistan and Iraq. While 
each conflict’s mosaic nature required (and still requires) sound leadership at 
all levels, particularly the local, Moyar uses these chapters to renew his assault 
on doctrinal fixations. “Afghanistan’s kaleidoscopic physical and human 
landscapes,” he argues, “heightened the importance of adaptivity and further 
reduced the value of doctrine.” In Iraq, the author rightly perceives more con-
tinuity between pre- and post-surge approaches to counterinsurgency than the 
popular Operation Iraqi Freedom narrative indicates. As such, Moyar believes 
the 2006 counterinsurgency field manual did not have as much impact as its 
authors intended. The new manual even “impeded innovation to a degree by 
advancing as universal certain principles and methods that were not actually 
viable in all or even most counterinsurgency settings.”
Moyar’s fundamental argument makes sense. Leadership in war counts. 
Yet as much as it offers a unique if simple approach to studying counterinsur-
gencies, A Question of Command proffers arguments that should be considered 
with care. Moyar’s attack on doctrinal infatuation is fine; however, an army 
founded on good doctrine does not necessarily make it doctrinaire. Whether 
counterinsurgency requires a higher degree of resourcefulness than conven-
tional operations seems equally tenuous. German and British innovations in 
the World War I trenches or American tactical adjustments in the World War II 
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Normandy hedgerows suggest that war, not just irregular war, requires all 
armies to adapt to their enemy and surroundings. Finally, Moyar’s thinly veiled 
backing of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy smacks of hubris. 
Throughout this work, third-world leaders fighting insurgencies are portrayed 
as inept and diffident administrators who only need American tutelage to be 
successful counterinsurgents. Moyar concedes at the end, though, that such 
“advice rarely sank in.”
A Question of Command is intended to assist counterinsurgents in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and, on the whole, it should be read, but with a careful eye. 
Moyar is surely correct that multifaceted wars require flexibility and creativity 
from military and civilian leaders. If readers can navigate through this work’s 
more specious supporting arguments, there is much to consider in developing 
leaders comfortable with the complexities of modern war.
